“Heartful” or “Heartless” Teachers? Or should we look for the Good Somewhere Else? Considerations of Students’ Experience of the Pedagogical Good

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Abstract

Educational practice is concerned in profound ways with what is pedagogically good and right for children, and as parents and teachers we intend to help each child to cultivate his or her personal and educational potential in a human fashion. In the spirit of ancient Aristotle and Plato, Continental pedagogues and philosophers have for centuries explored the meaning of pedagogical practice/praxis and of the pedagogical good, the quality of both being regarded not as a means to an educational end, but as the end itself. But what, indeed, is the pedagogical good, and what is the significance of the pedagogical good for students? Somehow we know the good, and yet we know it not. We recognize the good experientially, but the real meaning of what we intuit eludes our grasp. So how do we explore this elusive pedagogical quality – and is it possible to explore it? Based on phenomenological interviews with both young students and adults recalling episodes from school, as well as artistic narratives, this paper aims to illuminate experiential aspects of the pedagogical good and to reflect on the significance of the good in terms of pedagogical relational practice. It is suggested that the pedagogical good is not a quality that we as teachers can possess, or do, or practise, but rather a relational force beyond our pedagogical practice that opens up the world to children and preconditions the pedagogical relation.

Introduction

Oda, a student says:

When my answer is wrong, I know it immediately because Per [the teacher] looks at me with this particular humorous glance and says, after just a little pause: “Yes …?” Then I understand that he wants me to give the question a second thought. He just leans back comfortably and waits. That’s why I like him so much. I feel relaxed and smart with him.

What is the meaning of the pedagogical good to a student? What, indeed, is the pedagogical good? And how would the good be significant in respect of a student’s personal growth and development? Is it pedagogically appropriate to regard the good as of prime importance in teacher-student relationships? Oda values a glance and a moment of thoughtful silence from her teacher and feels encouraged and enabled by it. But is this gesture necessary for her growth into humankind or maturity? Is the kind of care that Oda appears to receive from her teacher what really counts for students? If it is, how then should we understand the relationship between education, the didactic process of providing and
receiving educational knowledge, and the pedagogical
good? Van Manen (1982) says:

… the pedagogical good is not a goal of
education which is itself a means to
another end. Rather the pedagogical good
is the end, the end in itself, from which all
our hope, love and inspiration for our
children draws its meaning. The increasing
ability to serve the good in our lives with
children we might call “pedagogic
wisdom” which actualizes itself in
“pedagogical tact”. (p. 47)

The pedagogical good is considered the end – not an
end alongside other ends – but the end in itself.
Didactic issues, as in education as a means to
particular knowledge and skills, are here subordinate
to pursuing a pedagogically good practice. The
practice of pedagogy, the direct everyday encounter
with students, is itself an immensely complex
experience with extensive theoretical and practical
implications, notably when understood as van Manen
does as a pedagogic practice of ethical and
responsible wisdom and tact. The term tact, from the
Greek tactus, meaning touch or affect, with tactful
meaning being fully in touch (van Manen, 1991/2006),
describes the adult’s thoughtful attitude, the
self-reflective reflection on human experience that is
a product of thoughtfulness. Tact and tactfulness, like
pedagogical goodness, are, as qualities of the
pedagogical relation, profoundly rooted in the belief
that the adult is there primarily for the child (not the
other way around). Moreover, van Manen (1990/2006)
reminds us that we, as human beings, in a
certain sense are what we see and understand,
and thus the way we see is a type of action. He writes,
“Because we are what we can see (hear, feel,
understand), seeing is already a form of praxis –
seeing the significance in a situation places us in the
event, makes us part of the event” (p. 130). The
Ancient Greek term praxis is a particular form of
action that is its own goal. Dunne (2001) describes
praxis in the following way: “Although Aristotle
introduces praxis as a kind of activity whose end is
not outside it, it is noticeable that he does not entirely
set aside the telic mould: praxis, we are to
understand, is its own end” (p. 262). Seeing students
is a kind of pedagogical praxis with its own end, the
end, as van Manen puts it, and this praxis is
articulated directly and indirectly in the pedagogical
relation. In the same way as love or friendship is
experienced when it is present between us, children
and young persons’ experience of being recognized in
the concrete pedagogical situation, where the adult
acts according to that which is pedagogically good
and right, thus helps the unique child to grow up
(Langeveld, 1975). Pedagogical practice, possessing
the qualities of praxis, intends to serve the good of
the student as its very end, and is by no means a clear-cut
and unambiguous notion to describe a single vital
quality of the pedagogical action. Rather, the
pedagogical good is characterized by the adult’s
attentive intention in the very action toward the
unique child in a particular situation (Langeveld,
1975), where the adult, under the condition of never
really knowing what is good, still is sensitive to the
ethical possibilities of the situation. There is no way
that we can prepare for it, and neither can we know
what will be good in any future situation. Van Manen
(1990/2006) puts it in the following way: “The
principle that guides my actions is a sense of the
pedagogic Good, [and] at the same time I remain
sensitive to the uniqueness of the person in the
particular situation” (p. 6). To sense the pedagogical
Good, it seems that we must live with considerable
uncertainty regarding a more substantial or tangible
meaning of pedagogical goodness. The pedagogical
good, like tact, seems to depend “on Gefühl [feeling
or sensitivity] and only more remotely on convictions

Student Experiences in Phenomenological Inquiry

Pedagogical reflection is oriented toward understand-
ing the significance of pedagogical events and
relations to children and their lifeworld, and
interpreting the meaning of these formative situations
and relationships for each child or student personally.
Over the last three or four decades, many studies of
student experiences of school and life in classrooms
have been published. Thiessen and Cook-Sather
(2007), for example, include discussions of a broad
variety of important theoretical and practical aspects
of qualities basic to educational and pedagogical
activity. According to Thiessen (2007), this
orientation to student experience includes three main
perspectives: the first relates to students’ participation
in and sense-making of life in the classroom, the
second involves students’ personal and educational
progress in school settings, and the third looks at
students’ involvement in and influence on their
learning environments (pp. 8–9). This paper falls in
line with the first, or what could be called student
experiential orientations. Methodologically, however,
it differs considerably from these, in that the focus of
the paper may at first sight seem rather conventional
and even antediluvian – or somewhat out of date.

1 The term “telic” from the Greek telos means aim (see, for
instance, Logstrup, 1996, s15ff.).
Methodologically, the paper reflects an approach to pedagogical inquiry known as the phenomenological anthropology of the Utrecht School (Levering & van Manen, 2002). Anthropological phenomenology perceives the human lifeworld as essentially intentional, and as such best investigated through lived experience and interpreted through the medium of language and art. Van Manen (2003b, p. 579), in line with Continental scholars like Dilthey and Gadamer, distinguishes between lived experience (from the German Erlebnis) and human experience, the main epistemological basis for qualitative research, on the basis that lived experience possesses special methodological qualities. Erlebnis, like the term lived experience, contains the word leben or life/to live – indicating the lived-throughness of something. Gadamer (1960/1985) observes that the term“experience” has a condensing, intensifying meaning … [and] if something is considered an experience its meaning rounds it into a unity of a significant whole” (p. 60). The ‘roundness’ of the lived experience prevents it from blending in with the rest of our life; makes it stand out, distinguishes it in our memory as a meaningful event to us. Phenomenological interviews and works of art allow us to “borrow” lived experiences from others in our effort to explore the actual phenomenon under investigation. In human science – and particularly, perhaps, in hermeneutic phenomenology – writing is closely merged with the research process. Along with van Manen (1990/2006, pp. 126–127), we consider ‘writing’ the very method, and although writing no doubt is a producing activity, writing first and foremost is a dialectic process of self-interpretation: of confronting oneself in self-reflective activity with the phenomenon of focus. Writing of students’ experience of the pedagogical good simultaneously distances us from the phenomenon and draws us closer to the lifeworld of children and young persons, as well as to the lived experience of the good in pedagogical relationships.

The ‘pedagogical good’, the phenomenological focus of this paper, is an idea related to the notions of virtue or excellence implied by the Ancient Greek arête – which was, at the time, simply a term used to describe qualities of an exemplary life; qualities that were not reducible to life rules or moral principles (van Manen, 2003a). The Ancient Greeks tended to describe the virtues of a good life exemplarily through narratives like myths, allegories and anecdotes. This narrative-reflective practice is methodically pursued by today’s phenomenological writers of the Utrecht School (see, for example, Henriksson, 2008; Kirova & Emme, 2006; Levering, 2000; Lippitz, 2007; Saevi, 2005, 2007; Smith, 2007; van Manen, 2003a, 2006, 2007b).

The concrete, evocative, lived-through experience, textualized as an anecdote (van Manen, 1989, 1991/2006), is the starting point and the end point of these phenomenological reflective inquiries. This paper is based on a selection of anecdotes gathered from interviews conducted over a period of three months with students in elementary school and former students, now adults. Here we focused on experiential descriptions of crucial episodes that these students either live or had lived in school. In addition to the student experiences, we also used a number of narrative excerpts from artistic sources, namely a film and a novel, to increase the depth of interpretation. Gathering lived experiences of the pedagogical good is, thus, to give “hermeneutic significance” to the meaning of the good for students, by reflectively “giving memory” to these experiences (van Manen, 1990/2006, p. 37).

Might the Pedagogical Good Derive from the ‘Not Good’?

Mollenhauer (1983/2003) and Nohl (1970) both consider the adult’s pedagogical attitude toward the child’s person and his or her human and educational potential as the most basic relational quality to support the child’s being and becoming human. But what does this teacher attitude consist of? How does it look in practical everyday school-life? And, most basic perhaps, how do students experience teachers’ pedagogical good in the classroom? Experientially we have a sense of what the pedagogically good is and what it is not; however, how is this goodness to be described and understood in one’s pedagogic practice? Can the pedagogical good be measured by the teacher or through such things as teaching evaluations, for example? Teacher qualification and fitness are more often evaluated by authorities, as well as by parents and students, in relation to educational outcomes in terms of learning results and instructional effects. However, would not any attempt to determine pedagogic practice mean that we must reduce its complexity in order to make it measurable? One way of solving the problem is to evaluate the learning outcome of the students based on instructional resources and efforts. Biesta (2006) strongly warns against seeing education as “a commodity – a ‘thing’ – to be delivered by the teacher … and to be consumed by the learner” (p. 20). This view is inclined to turn teachers and educational institutions into accountable deliverers of education; providers of knowledge that are committed to giving value for money received and to meeting the predefined needs of the consumer. However, education is more than teachers satisfying pre-ordained educational requirements. Pedagogical
practice, most assuredly, must be something quite different. The pedagogical good is a necessary part of every pedagogical situation, although not in predefined or calculable ways, but rather as a sense of what is good, alongside the ability to act thoughtfully on this feeling. The pedagogical intention, as Nohl and Mollenhauer insist, facilitates the present and future good of the student, rather than pandering to his or her preconceived needs. Neither the teacher nor the student is able to identify the student’s pedagogical needs beforehand. Teachers nevertheless carry within themselves the experience of being a student, and children carry within themselves “anticipations of adult life”. Merleau-Ponty (1948/1997) points out the double bind in adult-child relationships when he talks about the whole of man:

To be sure, there are motifs, quite abstract categories, that function very precociously in this wild thought, as the extraordinary anticipations of adult life in childhood show sufficiently; and one can say that the whole of man is already there in his infancy. The child understands well beyond what he knows how to say, responds well beyond what he could define, and this after all is as true of the adult. (pp. 12–13)

The responsibility of the teacher is precisely to recognize the uniqueness of the student, his or her potential as a whole person, and to act on this knowledge. Along with Langeveld, van Manen argues “that it is inevitable to see how the normative is intimately linked to our understanding of children’s experience since we are always confronted with real life situations wherein we must act: we must always do what is appropriate in our interactions with children” (2007b, p. 25).

The aim of this text, in exploring the meaning of the pedagogical good from the point of view of the child, the grown child, the child within us (Lippitz, 1986, 2007) and the artist describing aspects of children’s life experiences, presents somewhat of an elusive perspective, but nevertheless an important one. We attempt to provide insight into young persons’ understanding of what is the pedagogical good, by retelling anecdotes told by children, young persons and artists that retrospectively describe crucial pedagogical experiences.

The pedagogical relation has qualities both of an immediate situated togetherness and, at the same time, of a relation with lasting qualities for the young person (and the teacher as well). Still, the distinction between good and poor teaching might include hard-to-pin-down nuances, like this young boy, now a teacher himself, discloses to his friend:

In elementary school I had a poor teacher who never saw me or understood me. I was a quiet little boy and seemed to be almost invisible to him. So I didn’t have a good time in school. In grade 9, I decided to become a teacher myself. I didn’t really know why, but something inside of me told me that, while he had been such a bad teacher – I would become a good one. Paradoxically, I think for me what a good teacher is became apparent through the opposite.

The anecdote above emanates from a child’s experience of the lack of a pedagogical relation with a pedagogically good teacher. This experience somehow brings forth an understanding in this young boy of what could have been, along with a wish to become a different kind of teacher. Van Manen (1991/2006) suggests that being a teacher is deepened by the encounter with students. But perhaps being a student is deepened as well by the encounter with the teacher, for better or for worse?

Is the Pedagogical Good in the Teacher’s Heart?

Palmer, in his well-known work The Courage to Teach (1998/2007), reminds us that “good teaching” is an exceedingly complex practice characterized by the human and personal qualities of the particular teacher. As he writes:

Good teaching comes in myriad forms, but good teachers share one trait: they are truly present in the classroom, deeply engaged with their students and their subject. They are able to weave a complex web of connections among themselves, their subject, and their students, so that students can learn to weave a world for themselves. The connections made by good teachers are held not in their methods but in their hearts – the place where intellect and emotion and spirit and will converge in the human self. (p. 11)

What does this mean in terms of concrete pedagogical practice? Is it really possible to describe the good
teacher; to distinguish good teaching from bad, or good teachers from poor teachers? Van Manen (1991/2006) adds a disturbing dimension to the question of bad or good teaching and poor or good teachers, when he takes the Aristotelian stand of pedagogy as always already excellent. He writes: “But it is inappropriate to speak of excellent pedagogy, since pedagogy itself is already an excellence. In Aristotle’s words, pedagogy is a ‘good’ or a ‘virtue’. Every educator must possess this excellence” (p. 32). What does van Manen mean by asserting that pedagogy itself is already an excellence?

The term pedagogy derives from the Ancient Greek paideia, which refers to the fact that a slave escorted the child to school where the teacher, didaskalos, taught the student the school subjects. Pedagogue or paedagogus literally means child-leader: from pais (gen. paidos) “child” + agogos “leader,” a derivative of agein “to lead”. The virtue of the pedagogue is, then, to lead the child through life until the child him/herself can take over the responsibility for him/herself. And, according to van Manen (and Aristotle), this pedagogical responsibility is, in itself, an excellence, which makes it inappropriate to talk of excellent pedagogy as something that can or should be achieved by the teacher.

Somewhere the meaning of pedagogical practice and reflection within this perspective thus seems to require excellence, or it would not be pedagogic. What does this mean in terms of the concrete day-to-day relation between adult and child? We know from experience, as well as from research, that the relationship between adult and child may not be a relation that nurtures the good of the child. The adult might be disinterested, uninterested, careless or even ill-treating of or abusive toward the child. The relation may not be aimed at all at the good, but rather at doing harm or damage to the child’s developmental abilities, humanness and even his or her entire life condition. Van Manen (1991/2006, 2002) regards the pedagogical relation to be pedagogical. The adult’s intention toward the child as most important for the pedagogical relation to be pedagogical. The adult’s intention needs to be attentive to the good of the child in both the short and the long term. A pedagogical intention thus requires an attitude of responsibility, reliability and continuity that aims at helping the unique child to understand him/herself and the world (Langeveld, 1975). The pedagogical intention sees the subjective child in a personal way in order to support his or her unique existence. The Continental view of pedagogy as intentional practice resting on virtues also clearly focuses on the pedagogical relation as sui generis, a unique relation, or a relation of its own kind (Spiecker, 1984), distinguishable from other human relationships. Of what do these distinctions consist and how do we dress them in proper pedagogical terms?

Can the Pedagogical Good Come from a Teacher without Heart?

In the movie The Browning Version (Figgis et al., 1994), we are introduced to a teacher with the nickname “Hitler of the Lower Grade” – a teacher who, objectively seen (if it were possible to understand a teacher from a neutral or generalized standpoint), possesses crucial indications of a poor teacher. And yet, he somehow seems to appeal to at least one of his students.

Taplow is a student who, despite the class’s low opinion of the teacher, cares for “Hitler of the Lower Grade”. Entering the classroom, one of his fellow students asks him defiantly:

“Taplow, you should know. What’s up with the crock? Why is he retired?”

Taplow looks down, perhaps somewhat embarrassed, while his attempt to respond is drowned out by another student, who interrupts by answering:

“There is nothing wrong with him!”

A third student wonders if it might be his sick heart, but the first student responds:

“No, it is not his heart. There is nothing wrong with him, and it is probably pills.”

Taplow defensively says: “Grow up, bullies. It’s not pills. It is his heart.”

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3 http://www.etymonline.com/index
4 http://www.etymonline.com/index
Another student asserts loudly:
“It can’t be his heart. He hasn’t got one!”
And another student confirms this by saying:
“Right! He’s a sadist!”
“But I don’t think he hates people,” Taplow objects.
“I don’t think he likes people either, and he doesn’t care if people like him,” replies the student.5

While Palmer (1998/2007) suggests that the connections between the good teacher, his or her subject and his or her students are held in teachers’ hearts, the relation between the young student, Taplow, and his teacher, “Hitler of the Lower Grade”, does not appear to rest on the teacher’s having a heart or not. The student does not reject the teacher’s lack of heart; he simply matter-of-factly describes his way of relating to people. Van Manen (1994, p. 136) similarly depicts a grade 10 student’s experience of his teacher in a crucial moment for both of them:

Then a strange feeling came over me. It was at that moment that I suddenly realized something in a way that I had never understood. I realized that teachers were, in fact, real people too, with emotions and feelings of vulnerability just like mine. The actions of teachers too had their real reasons.

Somehow these two students are able to accept the otherness of their teachers in a perhaps ‘not-student-like’ way. For some reason, these students see their teachers in a ‘teacherly’ way – the way their teachers are supposed to see them – and hence they seem pedagogically considerate of their teachers’ needs and life-conditions. One may wonder if the students’ reactions are too rare to be attended to pedagogically, or if, perhaps, a relation where the pedagogical responsibility is twisted from the teacher to a student somehow becomes pedagogically inappropriate? This may be so. The two students’ affections and caring are not, however, to be considered pedagogical, as pedagogical care is, by definition, always directed toward someone younger and less mature than oneself (Spranger, 1958). The students’ affections are simply rooted in human thoughtfulness and concern for the human condition of their teachers.

Another anecdote can perhaps provide additional insight into the question of where the pedagogical good is located. A grown man describes his relation to his fourth grade teacher in the following way:

I have dyslexia and I was not able to read properly when I started in grade four. My new teacher was considered a very poor teacher among my fellow students. He did things like talking disapprovingly to students and he explicitly favoured some students and disregarded others. However, to me he was my rescue. I was clever in mathematics, which was his particular subject, and somehow I became one of his favourite students. He did not seem to mind my inability to read, and gave me good marks in spite of my bad written performances. This teacher helped me see myself as a capable person.

A poor teacher thus comes to mean the pedagogical and personal difference not only for the ten-year-old who was clever at mathematics, albeit unable to read, but also for the teenager and the grown man he became. The consequences of the relationship with the teacher definitely were good and lasting for this man, even if this teacher seems to lack important pedagogical qualities like a reliable personality, a moral character and selflessness (van Manen, 1991/2006, 2006). What, then, is at stake here? Obviously none of these teachers is good in the usual sense of what is considered the pedagogical good, described by various authors (see, for instance, Juul, 2004; Laursen, 2004; Palmer, 1998/2007). However, is the way of being of these teachers still pedagogical; is there excellence in their pedagogical practices? How do we identify the pedagogical (good) and distinguish it from the non-pedagogical? And where do we look for the pedagogical traits that do not seem to be obvious or visible in these teachers’ relational actions?

The Touch of Good?

Lars, at twelve, says:

My teacher always tells us stories from his childhood, and today he told about his last log rafting experience. He nearly drowned on this last trip. I sat at my desk spell-bound, and when I looked around me, my classmates’ glances were glued to the teacher’s eyes as he strolled along the row of desks, his hands gathered at his back. He looked out into the classroom, but still he seemed not really to be seeing us. In the telling, when his best friend was at one of

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5 The excerpt is a textual and contextual version of the verbal conversation in the movie, translated by the authors.
the timber rafts and he himself at the other, he said, “I’m here,” while touching Daniela’s head, “and my best friend is there,” as he lightly touched Trygve’s desk.

“IT is when I try to jump to the other raft that I miss and plunge between two drifting rafts into the dangerous stream with all the logs rushing down,” he said. My teacher always touches us or our desks with caring fingertips when he is telling us things.

While re-experiencing this situation from his class, this young student wanders to and fro in front of me, with his hands behind his back to show how his teacher walks when he tells them stories. He imitates his beloved teacher very well: a middle-aged man with a good-natured face, sharing with his students some of his critical life experiences. It is as Lars, while reliving the telling of the story and his experience of the situation, simply cannot leave out the imitation of the teacher’s movements and touch.

In Norwegian preschools in the early 1990s there was a slogan that said: “If you don’t touch me, I’ll die”. What kind of touch did the slogan infer was essential for the survival of small children? Is it a physical, emotional or intellectual touch? Do students, like toddlers, need the touch of adults? What, indeed, is a pedagogical touch? We are reminded once more by van Manen (1991/2006) of how Nohl (1970), in accordance with Herbart, developed the idea of tact and tactfulness in pedagogical practice. Tact refers to touch, which means “to handle or feel gently with the intent to appreciate or understand” in more than merely an intellectual manner (van Manen, 1991/2006, p. 126). Tact, or the Latin tactus, means to touch, to move or to have an effect. The prefix con, as in contact, intensifies the term by meaning “to touch closely” (p. 127). The teacher mentioned above thoughtfully includes the students in stirring events from his youth, while mildly touching their heads and/or desks with his fingertips, and as such he literally touches their hearts and heads. However, physical touch, as well as emotional touch, can also be cruel and harmful to the child; and so can be no touch at all, as the slogan suggests. Pedagogical tact or touch, on the other hand, is always directed toward the good of the child and is aware of what best serves this unique person in the concrete situation.

Sometimes, as we know from experience, the human touch takes precedence over speech. We may, for example, be at a loss for words when someone we know has undergone a tragic loss, and thus simply shake the other’s hand or embrace him or her wordlessly. The touch may be stronger than words, or different from words, in expressing the meaning of the situation for both the person touching and the person being touched. The touch, however, may mean something else for the one being touched than for the one touching. One may, for example, wonder if the adult in the description below is fully aware of how the young students experience his somewhat rough, but nevertheless caring, hands.

Jonas, at eight, tends to run home from school, but today he is snatched by the headmaster as he is about to leave the schoolyard. This is how Bjørneboe (1959, p. 101) describes the encounter between the old teacher (Jochumsen) and the boy:

When he came up to him, Jochumsen seized him and tickled him between the two thin sinews of his neck. The boy bent his head back and smiled a broad smile full of love. “Why don’t we have you?” he said. The headmaster took the boy’s ear between his fingers and rolled it back and forth. He pulled him along toward the gate. “We want you!” the boy said again. “Why can’t we have you?”

“Because I am so old and vicious,” the headmaster said. Nobody could see them, and the boy needed comfort now. He gripped the boy’s hair through his cap.

“I am so fierce that boys from the second grade go and hide in the chimney when I come into the room,” he continued and the boy held his hand while laughing breathlessly.

What is it about the headmaster’s touch that seems to soften the warning quality of his reprimand and the threat of his words? The obvious contradiction between the gentleness and the roughness of his hands, as well as the apparent inconsistency of his simultaneous teasing and the serious tone of his voice, his firm words, we could believe might scare Jonas, or at least confuse him. But the opposite seems to occur. From within this ambiguous and difficult to interpret situation (especially for an eight-year-old), trust emerges. What precondition does trust have in this relationship? Løgstrup (1956/1997) shows us that trust is a basic quality of human life, present in the very encounter between us. He also demonstrates, from experience, that trust is prior to distrust, and that children trust (or distrust) without reservation (p. 21). The child’s unconditional dependence thus, in the most profound way, passes the child over into the hands of the adult. Jonas seems to be in the hands of the headmaster, in the existential as well as in the physical and tangible meaning of the term. The
condition of human life, and even more so for children, seems to be that, while relating to one another, we are bound “to surrender something of ourselves to the other person either by trusting him or by asking him for his trust” (p. 19). In swordplay, we use the French word touché when the sword touches the opponent. If one is touched by the other’s sword, one is defeated and must surrender. Sword or hand, is there a difference in the outcome? What separates the condition of the child encountering the adult and the condition of the sword wielder being touched by the tip of the opponent’s sword? Firstly, swordplay is a game, while the child-adult relation is not. However, is the outcome, the surrender, relevant in both cases? Yes and no. Surrender in swordplay happens according to set rules and the sword player’s quarantine is temporary. In contrast, the pedagogical relation, and hence that which is pedagogically good for the child, depends on the intention of the adult to do good or not. Bauman (1996) characterizes the moral situation as a situation where the person has “the opportunity of being good (or evil)” (p. 117). Accordingly, the intention of the adult is the clue, and the child’s fragile life condition hangs on this often inconsistent attitude. Thus the child, like Jonas in the description above, is dependent on how the adult, the headmaster in this situation, takes responsibility for his response toward the trust that is offered him. To be able to respond pedagogically to the call of the child (Augustine, circa 354–430/1995), the adult must see the child as an “I”, an-other, a new beginner, a “not me”. Is this the case with the teachers above? Is being seen with recognition and thus with self-recognition, and being allowed a ‘new beginning’ something that is significant for the child’s experience of the pedagogical good?

How do we Recognize the Pedagogical Good?

Iris Murdoch (1971/2003) reminds us that life and the world are not transparent and thus are not immediately explicable to us. At the level of daily life and action, as Sokolowski says, “the world is not an astronomical concept; it is a concept related to our immediate experience” (2000, p. 44). The world is our context, the backdrop to our life, and the one and only scenario in which we can perceive the things and persons around us. We experience our context as real, simply accept it as such, and thus encounter the world with a taken-for-granted attitude, or what Sokolowski calls “the natural attitude” (p. 42). The moment we start to reflect on the meaning of a phenomenon in our daily lives, the taken-for-granted becomes confounded – for example, the moment I lean back and contemplate the meaning of language as language, instead of simply using the language as a textual practice or to communicate with others, then the huge intricacy and almost total opaqueness of the language begins to dawn on me. Merleau-Ponty (1948/1997, p. 3) stresses this tangled web-like quality of things when he writes,

> We see the things themselves, the world is what we see: formulae of this kind express a faith common to the natural man and the philosopher – the moment he opens his eyes; they refer to the deep-seated set of mute “opinions” implicated in our lives. But what is strange about this faith is that if we seek to articulate it into theses or statements, if we ask ourselves what is this we, what seeing is, and what thing or world is, we enter into a labyrinth of difficulties and contradictions. [italics added]

All phenomena of life, some perhaps even more so than others, have this complex, ambiguous and non-transparent quality. And if we look closer at these, by moving from the natural position of daily life to a reflective and textual practice, one might say even to a philosophical attitude – it appears that the term ‘pedagogical good’ may belong to an absolutely less transparent phenomenon. In a certain sense, and at an intuitive level, we recognize the good when we encounter it, but at the same time we may be unable to identify or define the good in terms of rational words and explanations. Even the idea of the good, according to Murdoch, “remains indefinable and empty so that human choice may fill it” (1971/2003, pp. 78–79). Murdoch considers the good a hard to define value of choice, and, as opposed to beauty, the good is “written in small letters” (p. 88).

We might articulate one of the inexpressible qualities of the pedagogical good by exploring the difference between being good and having success. What is the difference between being a successful teacher and being a good teacher? According to the etymological dictionary, the term success, from the Latin successus, means an advance, a result or a happy outcome. The Latin term succeedere, which we recognize in our verb to succeed, means the accomplishment of a desired end. The term good, from the Ancient Norse word meaning having the right or desirable quality, derives even further back from a term stemming from the Germanic gothaz, which originally meant belonging together, to unite

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6 The Norwegian original reads: “muligheten for å være god (eller ond)” (Bauman, 1996, p. 117).

7 http://www.etymonline.com/index
insight into the meaning of the pedagogical relationship and to experience himself as personally responsible for making a difference to future students. Taplow, the 5th grade student, as well as the student who for the first time realizes that his teacher is as vulnerable as himself, both experience an awakened sense of care and insight into the life condition of their disliked teachers. The young boy who has problems with writing and reading grows under the recognition of a commonly branded non-caring teacher. Lars admires his teacher and admits his teacher’s authority and love to influence his very being. Jonas responds with trust to the acknowledging touch of the strict headmaster. If these stories can in various ways describe the pedagogical good, where does the pedagogical good lie? What does it look like? Is it possible to discern the pedagogical good within, or perhaps beyond, the contexts of these examples, and to articulate it in pedagogically meaningful ways – even if the words remain tentative and elusive? Can these examples somehow contribute to a gain in insight into what the pedagogical good is? Is this possible, even if the term good is impossible to fully understand “partly because it has so many false doubles, jumped-up intermediaries invented by human selfishness to make the difficult task of virtue look easier and more attractive” (Murdoch, 1971/2003, pp. 89–90)?

Is the Good Not ‘Here’ but ‘There’?

Palmer (1998/2007) claims that his book “is for teachers who have good days and bad, and whose bad days bring the suffering that comes only from something one loves. It is for teachers who refuse to harden their hearts because they love learners, learning and the teaching life” (p. 1). What is pedagogical love? Is love something that exists in the teacher’s heart – and, if so, is this love sufficient either for the pedagogical good or to possess the excellence of pedagogy? Spranger (1958, p. 537) distinguishes between parental love and the love that we consider essential to genuine education. He focuses on the dilemma between the aesthetic and the ethic experience of educational love, delineating one of the dimensions present in adults’ and teachers’ affection for the child’s innocence and vulnerability. He sees this in the light of the Greek culture, pointing to Plato’s holding up the naïve beauty of the child as an important facet of educational love. Yet, the aesthetic dimension of educational love cannot free itself from erotic undertones, and is thus not pedagogically appropriate. “Neither beauty of youthful appearance, nor even beauty of the soul, should be the thing which draws forth the passion to educate. Both are gifts of fortune,” Spranger says (p. 539). Is it

They [the descriptions of pedagogical relationships] do not praise some idea of the true and only way of upbringing, they do not urge others to unreasoning imitation, and they do not overflow with pathos of progress. These texts and documents follow no trends or slogans. They speak comprehensibly and urgently. What do they speak about? (p. 9)

What do the seven examples of students’ lived experiences depicted above “speak about”? Is it somehow possible to come closer to an understanding of the pedagogical good and the significance of the good for these students by re-exploring for a moment the descriptions? Oda, for instance, feels competent and confident in the nearness of her tolerant teacher. The adolescent who decides to become a better teacher than the teacher he himself had, seems to gain

The term good also relates to holy, as in the Good Book, the Bible, and in Good Friday, the day of Christ’s death. What does etymology tell us about the original meaning of the two terms, and does this meaning have any significance for today’s pedagogical use of the terms? When in North America one talks of successful teaching, does it mean something different from when those in Norway speak of good teaching and good teachers? Spranger (1958) sees the pedagogical relation and action as one-sided in regard to the student and as a basically unappreciative act. He states that, “It [the object of affection in education] makes demands and is prepared to accept the fact that the extent of the love underlying these demands will go unrecognised” (1958, p. 543). One may suggest that only the good can resist not being appreciated and thanked. However, as Murdoch (1971/2003) says, “For all our frailty the command ‘be perfect’ has sense for us” (p. 90). Success, however, assumes appreciation and presupposes an audience, due to its sense for us” (1958, p. 543). One may suggest that only the good can resist not being appreciated and thanked. However, as Murdoch (1971/2003) says, “For all our frailty the command ‘be perfect’ has sense for us” (p. 90). Success, however, assumes appreciation and presupposes an audience, due to its sense for us” (1958, p. 543). One may suggest that only the good can resist not being appreciated and thanked. However, as Murdoch (1971/2003) says, “For all our frailty the command ‘be perfect’ has sense for us” (p. 90). Success, however, assumes appreciation and presupposes an audience, due to its sense for us”. (1958, p. 543). One may suggest that only the good can resist not being appreciated and thanked. However, as Murdoch (1971/2003) says, “For all our frailty the command ‘be perfect’ has sense for us”. (p. 90). Success, however, assumes appreciation and presupposes an audience, due to its sense for us”. (1958, p. 543). One may suggest that only the good can resist not being appreciated and thanked. However, as Murdoch (1971/2003) says, “For all our frailty the command ‘be perfect’ has sense for us”. (p. 90). Success, however, assumes appreciation and presupposes an audience, due to its sense for us”. The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org.

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the beauty of the soul of the child, or perhaps the beauty of the soul of the teacher, that Spranger has in mind? Palmer sees teaching as “a mirror to the soul” (1998/2007, p. 2), further asserting that “… none of us will transform education if we fail to cherish – and challenge – the human heart that is the source of good teaching” (p. 3).

What are the pedagogical consequences of seeing the teacher’s heart as the source of good teaching? Is it pedagogically and experientially true, or does the focus on the heart of the teacher somehow cover other, more complex, insights? Murdoch notes that “Goodness and beauty are not analogous but sharply contrasting ideas. Good must be thought of not as part of the world, but as a movable label affixed to the world; for only so can the agent be pictured as responsible and free” (1971/2003, pp. 3–4). What does this mean in terms of the pedagogical good? Palmer grounds his book in “the teacher’s inner terrain [which] constantly segues into the outer forms of community that teaching and learning require. The inward quest for communion becomes a quest for outward relationship: at home in our souls, we become more at home with each other”, he says (1998/2007, p. 5). This seems to make sense, but is it the fundamental challenge for pedagogy? Spranger asserts that education itself presupposes a medium of love (1958, p. 542), and holds up Pestalozzi and the home he created for the children and himself as the pedagogical example of how a pedagogue may mediate a pedagogical atmosphere between the children and himself wherein the good can grow. Pedagogical love, as Spranger and Palmer note, and as Pestalozzi practised in Stans, is a basic requirement for pedagogical relations to emerge and develop. But where does all this lead us? Let us for a moment turn to the concrete descriptions of lived experience that are fundamental to pedagogical practice and praxis and ultimately also to this text.

Hermeneutic phenomenology suggests that, in order to gain insight into a person’s understanding of self and others and of his condition of life, we should look at how the person relates to the objects of his or her world (van den Berg, 1972). “A phenomenologist is obsessed with the concrete,” van den Berg says (p. 76). The students’ experiential descriptions above derive from this passion for concreteness, as we see their responses to the prompt question not first and foremost as arguments, but as descriptions and interpretations of situations. Our past (and passed) experiences “speak to us in the present” (p. 79) by a certain experiential recognition, or with what Bachelard (1958/1994) calls reverberations, which go immediately beyond our assumptions and understandings and let us “experience resonances, sentimental repercussions, reminders of our past”. And he continues: “But the image has touched the depths before it stirs the surface” (p. xiii). What are the reverberations that the students’ stories leave behind? Where does the pedagogical good reside in the students’ experiences? Van den Berg (1972) shows us that the inter-human relationship, in a profound way, is the joint relation between objects, situations and events. The connection between persons, the basis of their very relation, is the association between the persons and their objects, duties, plans, interests – something that is out there, not in the relation between us (p. 67). We share some thing out there; we are in original contact with the objects of the world. How does this make sense with regard to the students’ experiences of the pedagogical good? Where does the good reside? Murdoch reminds us of the ancient Platonic cave story where man leaves the cave in favour of the sunlit world: “When Plato wants to explain Good, he uses the image of the sun. The moral pilgrim emerges from the cave and begins to see the real world in the light of the sun, and last of all is able to look at the sun itself” (1971/2003, p. 90). The real world is what we see by the light of the sun, or by the light of the good, pursuing Plato’s image. We see the world by the light of the good, but we do not fix our eyes on the good, as man is not able to look at the sun itself. While the good, like the sun, is visible and evident, at the same time it is of a quality that prevents us from looking directly at it, and thus somehow as an ‘object’ it is invisible or indiscernible to us. Like the sun, the good belongs to us experientially, but at the same time is of another kind – too immense, too unfathomable, for us to sense, let alone comprehend. How and what do students experience in the light of the pedagogical good? Or, one may rather ask, what would students not see, if the pedagogical good were not shining upon them? Plato shows us, as does Van den Berg, that the experience of the world, as well as of the self, starts out there in our shared world. By learning to see and know the shared world, we learn to see and know ourselves. The pedagogical good, like the sun, then, is not of a quality that we can possess, or do, or practise, but rather it is the force beyond our practice, the ray or spark that illuminates and makes visible the child and the meaning of the relation between us.

Conclusion

“Pedagogy itself is already an excellence,” van Manen asserts (1991/2006, p. 32), referring to Aristotle’s view of pedagogy as a good or a virtue. This is so, perhaps because, unlike what we often seem to believe, “the pedagogical and the ethical are
not only intertwined with each other, but they have never been separated. By seeing pedagogy primarily as methods, theories and/or conceptual knowledge, we remove pedagogical practice from the child and from the pedagogical relationship; simultaneously causing a separation between pedagogy and ethics”10 (Saevi, 2007, p. 126). Pedagogy itself is ethical, and first and foremost related to the adult’s sensitive thoughtfulness toward the child, and hence becomes a consideration of the educational situation. Pedagogy thus is not primarily a concept that describes a particular relationship, but rather pedagogy generates something in the relation between adult and child. What is being generated by the pedagogical good? How might children, young people or students, the addressees of the beam of the pedagogical good, perceive the good and relate to what they perceive? Like the sun does to man and life, the pedagogical good opens up the world to children and is the precondition for pedagogical relational life; by nature, however, it is too complex and disparate to be controlled by any system. The pedagogical good, like human life, according to Murdoch (1971/2003), is “subject to mortality and chance … and gives it [the concept Good] the only kind of shadowy unachieved unity which it can possess” (pp. 92, 94–95). We know the good and we know it not. We recognize it experientially but cannot pin it down, predetermine or control it, as the good slips between our fingers and evaporates. The descriptions of the students’ experiences are concrete and reveal details of the pedagogical good. At the same time, they speak of an impenetrable multitude of nuances and wholes, “and because the magnitude of the subject goes far beyond the scope of memory and power of reasoning” (Kafka, 1919/2001, ¶1), our language falls short of analyzing it. Like the meaning of a piece of art or painting, or a poetic text, the meaning of the pedagogical good lies in the experience of it for the child and in the imperfect descriptions we are able to give of it in order to help us distinguish it from its “false doubles” and misleading “intermediaries”.

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